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On 26 March 2023, voters will elect 470 deputies to Cuba’s National Assembly of People’s Power, who, in addition to fulfilling legislative functions during their five-year term, will be nominating Cuba’s next head of state. The government has characterized Cuba’s political system as a grassroots democracy, where candidacies to the parliament largely emerge from municipal authorities and are approved by the National Candidate Commission, a body composed of social organizations, such as labor unions and student associations.¹International Foundation for Electoral Systems, ‘Election for Cuban National Assembly of People’s Power,’ 2023; Al Jazeera, ‘Cuban opposition calls on voters to skip upcoming local elections,’ 24 November 2022 

In practice, however, Cuba’s electoral process has been criticized for blocking opposition members’ access to power. Notably, the Council for Democratic Transition in Cuba, a platform created by opposition members to promote pluralism, freedom, and human rights, has called voters to boycott the upcoming elections, after pro-government supporters reportedly prevented several opposition candidates from running in the November 2022 municipal elections.²CiberCuba, ‘Candidato independiente logra nominación a elecciones municipales en Cuba,’ 22 November 2022; Ivette Pacheco, ‘Activistas promueven campaña “Yo me abstengo” con vistas a elecciones del 26 de marzo en Cuba (VIDEO),’ Radio Televisión Martí, 6 March 2023 

Criticism of Cuba’s political freedom ahead of the 2023 electoral process takes place against a backdrop of anti-government mobilization and state repression of dissenting voices during the mandate of incumbent President Miguel Díaz-Canel. In 2021, the state responded to a historic uptick in demonstration activity prompted by shortages of basic goods and COVID-19 restrictions. In turn, state repression has targeted activists and opposition figures.³Observatorio Cubano de Derechos Humanos, ‘2021 – Detenciones Arbitrarias,’ 202 The government is also set to harden the crackdown on dissent with a new penal code that came into force in December 2022. The code criminalizes those “endangering the functioning of the State and the Cuban government,” the sharing of “fake information” online, and the intentional offending of another person.⁴Amnesty International, ‘Cuba: New criminal code is a chilling prospect for 2023 and beyond,’ 2 December 2022 

This report explores the main demonstration and political violence trends in Cuba since 2018, and highlights the key challenges shaping the country’s upcoming elections. It finds that the government has used a combination of repressive tactics to quell the population’s growing frustration and dissent amid socio-economic hardship. These tactics include the targeting of civil society opposition members, an increasing use of violence targeting civilians during periods of heightened demonstration activity, a resurgence of pro-government groups engaging in repressive acts, and heightened levels of arrests and short-term detentions. 

Unaddressed grievances and repression might lead to lower voter turnout in the upcoming elections, which could, in turn, further undermine the legitimacy of Cuba’s next government. The election results will be unlikely to trigger immediate demonstrations, since deputy candidates run alone in each jurisdiction, leaving little doubt about the outcome of the vote. However, should the new parliament fail to provide solutions to the country’s economic challenges, long-term anti-government mobilization will likely continue. Meanwhile, against a backdrop of persisting repression of opposition members, the parliamentary elections will be unlikely to bring about increased political freedom, as Cuba’s highest power continues to be vested in the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, a position held by President Díaz-Canel since 2021. Opposition members’ vocal expressions of dissent could result in more repression.

Opposition Mobilization and State Repression

Between January 2019 and March 2023, ACLED records a minimum of 209 events of violence targeting civilians. Violence has taken place across the country but mostly in the capital region, with attacks against civilians typically increasing during heightened demonstration activity. During this period, at least one person was killed during the violent repression of an anti-government protest in the town of Batabano, where police beat one person to death on 12 July 2021. On the same day, in Arroyo Naranjo, another demonstrator died during clashes with state forces. Amid state restrictions on press freedom, these events are likely not isolated cases but are indicative of the larger politically repressive environment in Cuba. 

State forces stand out as the main perpetrator of violence and have principally targeted members of dissident civil society organizations and journalists for their coverage of human rights violations and state repression. Ladies in White, the Patriotic Union of Cuba, the San Isidro Movement, and the Opposition Movement for a New Republic are among the opposition groups most targeted for their vocal opposition to the government. Some groups call for the release of political prisoners and others advocate for freedom of expression and pluralism but they all advocate for political change. 

Despite a government decree prohibiting all forms of opposition against the government and the entry into force of Cuba’s new penal code, civil society organizations have voiced their opposition to the Cuban regime ahead of the parliamentary elections. They launched a campaign calling Cubans to abstain from voting to delegitimize the election results and call for political change.⁵Diario de Cuba, ‘Campaña ‘Cuba dice NO a la dictadura’, un llamado a la abstención en las votaciones de marzo,’ 17 January 2023 While few events of physical violence were reported immediately before the poll, state forces have reportedly called in several activists participating in the campaign and in election observation for questioning.⁶Ivette Pacheco, ‘Denuncian amenazas a los activistas que promueven abstención en elecciones del 26 de marzo en Cuba,’ Radio Televisión Martí, 20 March 2023

Continued pressure and violence targeting dissident members takes place against a crackdown on opposition voices, which intensified in the years before the elections. In 2021, a wave of popular mobilization to protest against worsening living standards prompted violent government repression (see graph below).⁷14ymedio, ‘Con una inflación siete veces superior al aumento del salario, la pobreza se extiende en Cuba,’ 3 March 2023 The Cuban government ordered the arrests of demonstrators and opposition activists, in addition to the use of lethal force against protesters in Mayabeque. Similarly, in November, civil society organizations attempted to organize the ‘Civic March for Change,’ a countrywide protest calling for civil rights and the release of political prisoners, which the government sought to discourage through the targeted use of violence against civilians.⁸Jessica Domiguez and Jesús Arencibia, ‘El drama de la comida en Cuba,’ El Toque, 2021

In 2022, the Cuban government continued its repressive activity. This increased in July, when the government suppressed popular mobilization commemorating the July 2021 demonstrations and calling for the release of political prisoners. Similarly, civilian targeting rose in October, with the onset of mobilization against widespread power blackouts caused by the country’s aging and underfunded electricity grid infrastructure and damage from Hurricane Ian in September.⁹Andrea Rodríguez, ‘Small protests appear in Havana over islandwide blackout,’ Associated Press, 30 September 2022 

While state forces remain the main perpetrators of political violence targeting civilians in Cuba, they have also counted on the support of a countrywide network of pro-government groups, such as Rapid Response Brigades, to attack opposition members and conduct ‘acts of repudiation’ (see map below). Acts of repudiation first emerged in Cuba in the 1980s, involving mobs of government supporters shaming individuals who did not adhere to the precepts of the revolution by shouting insults, throwing eggs or litter, and sometimes physically assaulting their target.¹⁰Yadiris Luis Fuentes, ‘Actos de repudio: una forma de represión de las disidencias políticas en Cuba,’ Distintas Latitudes, 6 December 2021 Since 2020, ACLED records that acts of repudiation have gained momentum. While the groups are not officially coordinated by the state, civil society organizations claim that they are backed by the government.¹¹Amnesty International, ‘Cuba: Tactics of repression must not be repeated,’ 5 October 2022 The actions of these citizen groups have allowed the government to project popular support, while distancing itself from acts of repression.

Alongside the direct use of violence, the Cuban state has resorted to arbitrary arrests and house detentions to silence dissent, especially in 2021.¹²Observatorio Cubano de Derechos Humanos, ‘2021 – Detenciones Arbitrarias,’ 2021 Several reports have indicated that state forces detain members of the opposition without due process, hold them incommunicado for extended periods of time, and prevent them from accessing legal representation.¹³Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The State of the World’s Human Rights – Cuba 2021,’ 2022; Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2021: Cuba Events of 2020,’ 2021 Detentions often give rise to violence. ACLED records a significant share of prisoners targeting relative to overall violence targeting civilians levels, including the death of at least two people while under custody. Prison guards have been accused of beating and humiliating detainees – notably through forced stripping – in retaliation for their activities or complaints against detention conditions.¹⁴Human Rights Watch, ‘Prison or Exile: Cuba’s Systematic Repression of July 2021 Demonstrators,’ 11 July 2022 State forces also temporarily arrest individuals to prevent them from participating in demonstrations or meetings, such as the arrests of prominent activists in November 2021 to impede the holding of the ‘Civic March for Change.’ Ahead of the November 2022 municipal elections, law enforcement arrested an opposition member and prevented them from registering as a candidate.¹⁵CiberCuba, ‘Candidato independiente logra nominación a elecciones municipales en Cuba,’ 22 November 2022 Harassment and continuous arrests have, however, most particularly targeted leaders of civil society organizations, with state forces arresting Berta Soler, leader of Ladies in White, at least 42 times since 2021 to date. 

Looking Forward

The rise of the population’s discontent linked to socio-economic hardship led to record abstention rates during the November 2022 local elections.¹⁶Mauricio Vicent, ‘La alta abstención marca un nuevo escenario político en Cuba,’ El País, 28 November 2022 While President Díaz-Canel has acknowledged the difficulties faced by the Cuban population, opposition groups claim he has failed to address the country’s economic problems, stating that 2023 could bring even greater challenges.¹⁷Diario de Cuba, ‘Díaz-Canel a los cubanos: 2023 ‘podría ser aún más difícil’, pero ‘más atractivo para el que se sienta revolucionario,’ 2 January 2023

With the end of the economic crisis nowhere in sight, voters could – similarly to the November 2022 local elections – demonstrate their dissatisfaction at the polls, with social organizations continuing to promote abstention. Although a high abstention rate would have little impact on the final voting outcome, it could confer the National Assembly of People’s Power and the future president — to be nominated by the incoming parliament — less legitimacy before the population and allow to gauge overall dissatisfaction levels. 

Regardless of voter turnout, the election results will be unlikely to prompt significant political change or immediate demonstrations, with many among the electorate disillusioned with the country’s electoral system. Persisting socio-economic challenges, however, will continue to weigh on a new parliament and could lead to demonstrations. Despite Cuba’s repressive environment, which has prompted a rise in dissidents taking up exile abroad,¹⁸James Clifford Kent, ‘Cuba: why record numbers of people are leaving as the most severe economic crisis since the 1990s hits – a photo essay,’ The Conversation, 17 February 2023 civil society groups continue to call for freedom of expression and pluralism.¹⁹Ed Augustin, ‘As independent media blossoms in Cuba, journalists face a crackdown,’ The Guardian, 20 January 2023 Coming into the next parliamentary term, state repression of Cuban civil society and demonstrators will likely continue unabated, with the implementation of the country’s new penal code, which criminalizes and limits anti-government activity, including digital activism.²⁰Amnesty International, ‘Cuba: New criminal code is a chilling prospect for 2023 and beyond,’ 2 December 2022